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Abstract—Achieving cloud security is not a trivial problem
and developing and enforcing good cloud security controls is a
fundamental requirement if this is to succeed. The very nature
of cloud computing can add additional problem layers for cloud
security to an already complex problem area. We discuss why this
is such an issue, consider what desirable characteristics should be
aimed for and propose a novel means of effectively and efficiently
achieving these goals through the use of unikernel based systems.
The main thrust of this paper is to discuss the key issues which
need to be addressed, noting which of those might be covered by
our proposed approach. We discuss how our proposed approach
may help better address the key security issues we have identified.
Index Terms—Cloud security and privacy; management con-
trol; compliance; complexity
I. INTRODUCTION
There are a great many barriers which must first be over-
come before the goal of cloud security can be achieved. Much
research has been conducted towards resolving this problem
through technical means, but this presents a fundamental flaw.
The business architecture of a company comprises people,
process and technology [1], and any solution which will focus
on a technological solution alone will be doomed to failure.
People present one of the most serious weaknesses to company
security [2], and while process may be very well documented
within an organisation, often it is out of date due to the rapid
pace of evolution of technology [3]. Technology can benefit
companies due to the ever improving nature and sophistication
of software, which is a good thing, but on the other hand,
presents a much higher level of complexity for proper and
secure implementation within company systems. However, the
threat environment is also developing at a considerable pace
[4].
Cloud brings a far higher level of complexity than is the
case with traditional distributed systems, in terms of both
the additional complexity of managing new relationships in
cloud, and in the additional technical complexities involved in
running systems within the cloud. It runs on other people’s
systems, and instances can be freely spooled up, and down,
as needed. This leads to concerns over proper maintenance
of an adequate audit trail [5], and forensic examination can
range between difficult and impossible. We seek to address
these problems by taking a more simplistic approach, with the
goal of limiting the dependence of the company on the people
who use the system, thus removing as many opportunities for
human error as possible.
We are concerned with achieving both good security and
good privacy. While it is possible to have security without
privacy, it is not possible to have privacy without security. Thus
our approach in this paper will be to first ensure a good level of
security can be achieved, and to that end, we start by listing the
specific security issues we seek to address and discuss how we
propose to tackle them in Section II, in which we necessarily
look at the literature in some depth. It is important to take
this approach, because this is the first paper in a series, which
will allow us to continuously refer to this paper in all the
subsequent work, thus saving us from unnecessary duplication.
Since we will first concentrate on security, this means we will
leave addressing privacy for a later paper. The remainder of
the paper is organized as follows: in Section III, we discuss the
outline of our proposed approach; in Section IV, we discuss
the need for some proper definitions, which will be addressed
in detail in our next paper; and in Section V, we discuss our
conclusions.
II. THE SPECIFIC SECURITY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
It is well known that the fundamental concepts of infor-
mation security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA). This concept was developed when it was common
practice for corporate management to run a company under
agency theory, which, as we have all seen, clearly demonstrates
a fundamental weakness in agency theory, the failure to curb
the excesses of corporate greed. The same is true for cloud
security, which would suggest a different approach is needed
[6]. The business environment is constantly changing [5], as
are corporate governance rules and this would clearly imply
changing security measures would be required to keep up to
date. More emphasis is now being placed on responsibility
and accountability [7], social conscience [8], sustainability
[9] [10], resilience [11] and ethics [12]. Responsibility and
accountability are, in effect, mechanisms we can use to help
achieve all the other security goals. Since social conscience
and ethics are very closely related [13] [14], we can expand
the traditional CIA triad to include sustainability, resilience
and ethics.
Ten key security issues have been identified [6], namely:
• The definition of security goals;
• Compliance with standards;
• Audit issues;
• Management approach;
• Technical complexity of cloud;
• Lack of responsibility and accountability;
• Measurement and monitoring;
• Management attitude to security;
• Security culture in the company;
• The threat environment.
A. The definition of security goals
Since many managers are unable, unwilling or unsure of
how to define proper security goals [15] [16] [13], we seek to
build this requirement into the system as a fundamental part
of our approach. Thus, our basic approach will be “secure by
design”[17].
B. Compliance with standards
Bearing in mind earlier comments on the issues with cloud
security standards [18] [19], compliance audit mechanisms
[20] [21], and the general consensus that standards need to
shift from a rule based approach to a risk based approach
[22] [23] [24] [25] [16] [26], we believe approaching this
problem in a simple and robust manner will allow compliance
with any relevant standard in future. One welcome change
from the standards setting bodies is the move away from a
strict rule based compliance approach to a more risk based
approach, although time taken from inception to agreement
and implementation remains a concern.
C. Audit issues
There are three main purposes of audit [5], the most
widely understood of which is the statutory requirement for
financial statements to be audited by an independent external
auditor, a cornerstone of confidence in global financial systems
since auditing was introduced [19]. The second purpose of
audit is IT systems audit, and the third is compliance, either
with regulations, or more often with standards. We suggest
that it is necessary for management to understand better the
purpose, and importance, of audit [5] [27] [13] [14] [28].
It is also necessary to understand both the key importance
and weaknesses offered by the audit trail [6]. We will deal
with this by providing everything that is necessary within our
framework to ensure proper audit can be achieved, without
complex configuration.
D. Management approach
There is no doubt that management approach is a key
consideration to be aware of in addressing the complex re-
lationships involved in the cloud ecosystem [29]. While all
actors do not utilise the same approach, it is certainly helpful
for management to be able to recognise the management
approach which is used by each of the actors involved within
their own cloud ecosystem. This allows them to better identify
any key risks they face and take appropriate mitigating action.
Management approach can have an enormous impact on the
success of cloud security and privacy and [29], provide some
useful background on this. We aim to reduce this impact by
providing security and privacy by default, and by limiting
management options, thus ensuring we can deliver a secure
and private system.
E. Technical complexity of cloud
The increasing complexity which new technology brings,
results in increased potential exposure to risk brought about
by a failure to grasp the significance of these potential risks
[30]. Traditional distributed information systems present a
multiplicity of technical layers, each of which must interact
with one or more other layers. Cloud introduces further layers,
each of which can be operated by different actors. Cloud
brokers may also be involved, leading to yet more layers, more
complexity, and more risk. Cloud allows a user to quickly
deploy, for example, a web server with a database back end,
where users often rely on default settings, which can lead to
a number of weaknesses [5]. These default settings usually
pay far more attention to usability than to security. The same
is true for web server software, database software and many
other complex pieces of business software. Many users fail
to realise that the default settings of a database switch off
audit logging, making the attacker’s life much easier [6].
These technical complexities introduced by cloud need to be
expressly addressed [31] [32] [33], to identify and deal with as
many weaknesses as possible, particularly when considering
the maintenance of a proper forensic trail [34].
F. Lack of responsibility and accountability
Monahan and Yearworth [35] observe that Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) should be meaningful, both for cloud
users and providers, as defined by some objective criteria.
It is clear that evidence from procurement failures for large
IT systems suggests otherwise. This observation has inspired
an investigation into the possibility of offering alternative
security SLAs that would be meaningful to both customers and
vendors. Duncan and Whittington [13] provide some useful
background on these issues in SLAs.
It is hard to allocate proper responsibility to the right actors
[36], for personal data [37] and privacy [38], far less persuade
them to accept responsibility for it. Some [39] [38] [40],
have long argued that responsibility and accountability should
always be built in to the design of cloud systems. Much as
we would like to have built these factors into our approach,
the nature of these issues is such that they must be dealt
with by a combination of management, measurement, and
negotiation with cloud service providers (CSP)s in setting up
more accountable SLAs.
G. Measurement and monitoring
We see a good deal of research into measurement of CSR,
[41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48], resilience [49] [50]
[51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] and sustainability [57] [58] [59],
yet there is still some way to go before effective measures are
developed. While measurement is extremely important, it can
be very difficult to achieve. There exists a clear need to employ
some method of continuous monitoring when it comes to
security management. Reports from global security companies,
which cover both non-cloud and cloud data [1] [60] [61],
suggest that over 85% of security breaches are achieved with a
low level of technical competence, often facilitated by lack of
understanding, lack of competence, or poor configuration of
victims’ systems. Duncan and Whittington [14] provide useful
background detail on this.
Our first key challenge is the need to define proper security
goals, before devising suitable measurements or metrics with
which to determine whether these goals are being met. This
should be achieved through constant monitoring [62] [63] [18]
[14]. This is the only way to prove that the desired security
objectives determined by management are being achieved [14].
H. Management attitude to security
Management attitude to security has long been a high
priority [64]. In [65], 77% of security professionals have
recognised the need to set security attitudes from the top.
According to a report [1], management attitude is high, if
you listen to the executives, yet low when you listen to IT
practitioners. Thus management need to be fully aware that
it is not simply a technical issue to be passed down the line,
rather it is a fundamental business process which needs to
be driven right from the top of the organisation. Information
security presents one of the largest risks facing business today
and needs to be given the proper attention and commitment
it requires. We hope to ease this by taking a more simple
approach.
I. Security culture in the company
One of the most important aspects of creating good security
in a company is the development and maintenance of a good
security culture within the organisation. This has long been
recognised [64] [65] [1], but is dependent on the attitude to
security displayed by top management. This must be coupled
with proper staff training to ensure staff understand how to
deal properly with security threats. It is estimated [1], that in
2012, only 26% of companies with a security policy believed
their staff understood how to use them. This is an issue for
management to deal with, however, our simplified approach to
the problem should help them more easily create an effective
security policy.
J. The threat environment
It is necessary to recognise the magnitude of the threat
environment. Companies are bound by legislation, sometimes
regulation, the need to comply with standards, industry best
practice, and are accountable for their actions. Criminals have
no such constraints. They are completely free to bend every
rule in the book, do whatever they want, manipulate, cajole,
hack or whatever it takes to get to the money. They are
constantly probing for the slightest weakness, which they are
more than happy to exploit without mercy. It is clear that
the threat environment is developing just as quickly as the
technological changes faced by industry [19] [29] [28]. We
need to be aware of this threat, and minimise the possible
impact on our framework. While we have absolutely no control
over attackers, we can help reduce the impact by removing as
many of the “classical attack vectors” as possible, thus making
their life far more difficult. The more difficult it becomes for
them to get into the system, the more likely they will be to
go and attack someone else’s system.
III. OUR PROPOSED SOLUTION
Again, by default, in the interests of usability, many more
ports are open than may be needed to run a system. An open
port, especially an un-needed one, is another route in for the
attacker. We also take the position that the probability of vul-
nerabilities being present in a system increases proportionally
to the amount of executable code it contains. Having less
executable code inside a given system will reduce the chances
of a breach and also reduce the number of tools available
for an attacker once inside. As Meireles [66], said in 2007
“... while you can sometimes attack what you can’t see, you
can’t attack what is not there!”. We propose to address these
issues by making the insides of the virtual machine simpler
– but we should also address the outside. We also propose to
tackle the audit issue by making configuration happen at build-
time [67][68], and then making services be “immutable” after
deployment, making “configuration lapses” (i.e. through con-
flicts caused by unnecessary updates to background services
etc.) unlikely.
Given the success with which the threat environment contin-
ually attacks business globally, it is clear that many companies
are falling down on many of the key issues we have highlighted
in Section II. It is also clear that a sophisticated and complex
solution is unlikely to work. Thus we must approach the
problem from a more simple perspective.
A. Service isolation
A fundamental premise for cloud computing is the ability to
share hardware. In private cloud systems, hardware resources
are shared across a potentially large organization, while on
public clouds, hardware is shared globally across multiple
tenants. In both cases, isolating one service from the other
is an absolute requirement.
The simplest mechanism for service isolation is simply
process isolation in classical kernels, relying on hardware
supported virtual memory e.g. provided by the now perva-
sive x86 protected mode. While process isolation has been
used successfully in mainframe setups for decades, access
to terminals with limited user privileges has also been the
context for classical attack vectors such as stack smashing,
root-kits, etc., the main problem being that a single kernel
is being shared between several processes, and that gaining
root access from one terminal would give access to everything
inside the system. As a result, much work was done in the
sixties and seventies to find ways to completely isolate a
service without sharing a kernel. This work culminated with
the seminal 1974 paper by Gerald J. Popek and Robert P.
Goldberg [69] where they present a formal model describing
the requirements for complete instruction level virtualization,
i.e. hardware virtualization.
While hardware virtualization was in wide use on e.g.
IBM mainframes since that time, it was not until 2005 that
the leading commodity CPU manufacturers, Intel and AMD,
introduced these facilities into their chips. In the meantime,
paravirtualization had been re-introduced as a workaround
to get virtual machines on these architectures, notably in
[70]. While widely deployed and depended upon, the Xen
project has recently been evolving its paravirtualization in-
terface towards using hardware virtualization in e.g. PVH
[71] stating that “PVH means less code and fewer Interfaces
in Linux/FreeBSD: consequently it has a smaller Trusted
Computing Base (TCB), and attack surface, and thus fewer
possible exploits” [72].
Another isolation mechanism is operating system-level vir-
tualization with containers, e.g. Linux Containers (LXC) pop-
ularized in recent years by Docker, where each container
represents a userspace operating environment for services that
all share a kernel. The mechanism for isolating one container
from another is classical process isolation, augmented with
software controls such as cgroups and Linux namespaces. Con-
tainers do offer less overhead than classical virtual machines.
An example where containers makes a lot of sense would
be trusted in-house clouds, e.g. Google is using containers
internally for most purposes [73]. We take the position that
hardware virtualization is the simplest and most complete
mechanism for service isolation with the best understood
foundations, as formally described by Popek and Goldberg,
and that this should be the preferred isolation mechanism for
secure cloud computing.
B. Why Use Unikernels?
Using hardware virtualization as the prefered isolation
mechanism, we take the view that there are three basic
approaches we can use to deliver our requirements, namely the
monolithic system/kernel approach, the microkernel approach
and the unikernel approach. IaaS cloud providers will typically
offer virtual machine images running Microsoft Windows or
one or more flavours of Linux, possibly optimized for cloud
by e.g. removing device drivers that are not needed. While
specialized Linux distributions can greatly reduce the memory
footprint and attack surface of a virtual machine, these are
general purpose multi-process operating systems and will by
design contain a large amount of functionality that is simply
not needed by one single service. We take the position that
virtual machines should be specialized to a high degree, each
forming a single purpose micro service, to facilitate a resilient
and fault tolerant system architecture which is also highly
scalable.
In our next paper, we will discuss six security observations
about various unikernel operating systems: choice of service
isolation mechanism; use of a single address space, shared
between service and kernel; no shell by default and the
impact on debugging and forensics; the concept of reduced
attack surface; micro services architecture and immutable
infrastructure; and single threaded by default. We shall argue
that the unikernel approach offers the potential to meet all
our needs, while delivering a much reduced attack surface,
yet providing exactly the performance we require. An added
bonus will be the reduced operating footprint, meaning a more
green approach is delivered at the same time.
C. How Does This Compare to a Conventional System?
Looking at what Frederick P. Brooks Jnr. suggests in [74],
“Because ease of use is the purpose, this ratio of function
to conceptual complexity is the ultimate test of system de-
sign. Neither function nor simplicity alone defines a good
design”, we can see where modern software systems are
missing the point. The more complex a system becomes, the
more overhead is introduced, leading to greater complexity
and ultimately unnecessary bloat, draining performance, and
exposing vulnerabilities.
Conventional cloud systems tend to be over-complicated,
unnecessarily bloated, and therefore expensive to scale.
Unikernels, on the other hand in [75], “Unikernels are spe-
cialized, single-address-space machine images constructed by
using library operating systems”, meaning they are exactly
the right size to carry out their given task — no larger,
and no smaller. Our proposed approach, using unikernels,
limits/enforces the software architect to use a given pat-
tern (event-based computing using the single-responsibility-
principle, service-oriented architectures, separation of data and
processing, and modularity) — which is very good from a
software design point of view. We are trying to get people to
use “best-of-breed” patterns and thus develop better software
through this limitation.
IV. DEFINITIONS NEEDED
In order to reason further about the security properties of
unikernels we need to develop precise definitions. What are
unikernels? What are machine images? How is a single address
space relevant and why is a library operating system necessary
to reduce their attack surface? In the next paper [76], we will
try to answer these question by providing simple but exact
definitions of the following:
• Library operating system: The term is used loosely about
different kinds of operating systems and we need to fixate
the meaning in order to attach any security properties to
it.
• Unikernel: Several projects are mentioned under this
umbrella that clearly share the property of being aimed
at running a single service, but it is not clear how much
else they might have in common. The term is also used
for both the operating system as a whole and for the
individual instances of services built with these operating
systems by various authors.
• Machine images and service isolation mechanisms: any-
thing from language runtimes such as JVM to paravirtual-
ized processes running in userspace, to a disk image made
to boot on hardware virtualization can be coined ”virtual
machines”. What’s stopping a single java program from
being called a unikernel?
• Attack surface: What exactly forms the attack surface of
virtual machines? Is it enough to identify the sensitive
data accessible to the process behind an open port? The
claim that building a unikernel from a library operating
system reduces attack surface needs further qualification
in order to provide real confidence.
While we will seek to provide answers to these questions
through precise definitions, it is important to keep in mind that
we will not decide on which projects do or do not fit them;
this will have to be an ongoing process where the burden of
proof will lie with the creators of such systems as to whether
or not the system has the desired properties. It is, however, our
belief that well defined nomenclature is the first step towards
creating reliable specifications which, again, is the first step
towards secure implementations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified in Section II, some ten key security
issues which need to be addressed in order to address potential
barriers to successful implementation of good cloud security
and privacy. We have given an overview of important tech-
nologies underpinning unikernels and motivated the need for
more precise definitions in Section III, and have gone on to
provide a comparison of these with unikernel based systems in
order to identify how successful each might be in the context
of dealing with security and privacy issues. We have identified
how our unikernel approach might offer a better solution. In
addition, due to the reduced size of the unikernel, we can
benefit from reduced resource consumption.
Having now established that our proposed approach can
offer significant potential benefits in a cloud scenario, in the
next paper we provide a framework of definitions and well
defined properties of unikernels, and show how these can serve
as a framework for higher level system compositions and cloud
architectures. Our third paper will build on this framework and
show how cloud computing architectures can be made more
secure using unikernels. We will consider the potential threats
posed by malicious actors, and will compare how robust our
proposed approach might be as compared against conventional
systems.
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